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Premises Human Imagination of Machines
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Premises Human Imagination of Machines
The Obsession with (Autonomous) Machines II
Machines doing something “by themselves”
an obsession coming with technique
basically, representing our way to affect the world around us
possibly, according to our goals
China, Greece, Italy, England, France
hundred years of attempts, and some success, too
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Premises Human Imagination of Machines
The Obsession with (Autonomous) Machines V
Aren’t humans just “playing God”?
maybe, ok, good point.
fascination was so huge, too
so strong, that fake automata were even quite frequent, and even
famous
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Premises Human Imagination of Machines
The Obsession with (Autonomous) Machines VII
The original question
what can human artefacts actually do?
what can they achieve?
what can humans achieve with the systems they create?
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Premises Human Imagination of Machines
Before Autonomous Systems: Machines I
Constructing for understanding
building machines with
initiative
autonomy
knowledge
for understanding ourselves, and the world where we live
“playing God” to understand the world
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Premises Human Imagination of Machines
Before Autonomous Systems: Machines II
Relieving humans from fatigue
goal: substituting human work in
quality
quantity
cost
more, better, cheaper work done
new activities become feasible
which work?
first, physical
then, repetitive, enduring
subsequently, intellectual, too
finally, simply more complex for any reason—or, all reasons together
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Premises Human Imagination of Machines
Before Autonomous Systems: Machines III
Some steps beyond
delegating human functions to machines
within already existing social structures, organisations, and processes
creating new functions
then, making new social structures, organisations, and processes
possible
example: steam engines on wheels
essentially, changing the world we live in
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Premises Early Symptoms
Autonomous Software Creatures
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Premises Early Symptoms
Autonomous Robot Toys
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Premises Early Symptoms
Autonomous Vacuum Cleaners
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Premises Early Symptoms
Autonomous Lawnmowers
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Premises Early Symptoms
Autonomous Cars
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Premises Early Symptoms
Autonomous Aircrafts
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Premises Early Symptoms
Autonomous Weapons
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Premises Early Symptoms
Autonomous Soccer Players & Teams
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Premises Early Symptoms
Social Pressure
activities that might be delegated to artificial systems grow in number
and complexity
people & organisations are already experiencing / conceiving
“somehow autonomous” systems, and ask for more
engineers are not yet trained on general approaches to build
autonomous systems
however, the theory of autonomous systems is at a good stage of
development, and technologies are rapidly growing in terms of
availability and reliability
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Premises Artificial Systems
Machines & Artificial Systems I
Systems and machines
we call systems what many years ago we simply called machines
complexity has grown
more and more we understand the many levels at which systems, their
components, their mutual relationships can be described
furthermore, at the right level of abstraction, HW / SW systems are
machines in the same acceptation as mechanical machines
here, we will mostly deal with two non-strictly coherent, but simple
notions
system as a primitive notion (which somehow we all share to a certain
extent)
system as an engineer-designed entity (“draw a line around what you
call ’a system’”)
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Premises Artificial Systems
Machines & Artificial Systems II
Artificial systems
here we mostly talk about artificial systems in general
systems either partially or totally designed by humans
either directly or indirectly
? systems designed by systems?
featuring
a goal (in the mind of the designer)
a function (in the body of the system)
and implicitly consider the computational part as an essential one
an artificial system, roughly speaking, is any sort of system which
humans put at work by assigning it a function in order to achieve
some goal
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Premises Artificial Systems
Which Sorts of Systems? I
Artificial & computational systems
nowadays, most (if not all) artificial systems have a prominent
computational part
for this and other obvious reasons, here we focus on that sort of
systems
computational machines
have both an abstract and a physical part
where the physical portions are often abstracted away
are (mostly) symbolic
can deal with math, logic, data, information, knowledge
are general-purpose machines
programmable, can be specialised to most purposes
Andrea Omicini (DISI, UniBO) Frontiers of Autonomous Systems Bologna, March 2018 30 / 276
Premises Artificial Systems
Which Sorts of Systems? II
Artificial systems in context
most artificial systems participate to the activities of individuals,
groups, and societies
even more, nowadays they are mostly essential to all sorts of human
activities
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Premises Artificial Systems
Which Sorts of Systems? III
Socio-technical systems (STS)
socio-technical systems (STS) arise when cognitive and social
interaction are mediated by information technology, rather than by
the natural world alone [Whitworth, 2006]
in other words, any system in which the infrastructure enabling and
constraining interaction is technological, but the evolution of the
system is driven by social and cognitive interactions, is a STS
so, STS are artificial systems where both humans and artificial
components play the role of system components
ranging from online reservation systems to social networks
most of nowadays systems are just STS
or, at least, cannot be engineering and successfully put to work without
a proper socio-technical perspective in the engineering stage
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Premises Artificial Systems
Which Sorts of Systems? IV
Pervasive systems
affecting every aspects of our everyday life
by spreading through the whole environment where we live and act
we live surrounded by pervasive systems
Situated systems
the physical nature of artificial components cannot be always be
forgot
as well as the situatedness in time and space
along with the influence of the surrounding environment
most of the interesting systems, nowadays, are situated systems, too
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Premises Artificial Systems
What is the Matter with Autonomy? I
Who does what?
this is no longer an issue
artificial system are very welcome to do whatever we like
Who takes the decision?
autonomy is at least as much about deliberation as about action
e.g., for artificial weapons, the question is not “who pulls the trigger”,
but rather “who decides to pull the trigger”
here, ethical issues become more than relevant
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Premises Artificial Systems
What is the Matter with Autonomy? II
Who is responsible?
what is something goes wrong?
who is going to take responsibility – under either civil law or criminal
law?
legal issues are here as least as relevant as technical issues
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Language
Oxford Dictionary of English (2nd Edition revised 2005)
Etimology
Early 17th cent.: from Greek autonomia, from autonomos ‘having its own
laws’, from autos ‘self’ + nomos ‘law’.
Dictionary
autonomy
the right or condition of self-government
a self-governing country or region
freedom from external control or influence; independence.
(in Kantian moral philosophy) the capacity of an agent to act in
accordance with objective morality rather than under the influence of
desires
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Language
Oxford Thesaurus of English (2nd Edition revised 2008)
Thesaurus
autonomy
self-government, independence, self-rule, home rule, sovereignty,
self-determination, freedom, autarchy;
self-sufficiency, individualism.
Andrea Omicini (DISI, UniBO) Frontiers of Autonomous Systems Bologna, March 2018 39 / 276
On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Language
Merriam-Webster I
Dictionary
autonomy
1 the quality or state of being self-governing; especially: the
right of self-government
2 self-directing freedom and especially moral independence
3 a self-governing state
synonyms accord, free will, choice, self-determination, volition, will
antonyms dependence (also dependance), heteronomy, subjection,
unfreedom
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Language
Merriam-Webster II
Thesaurus
autonomy
1 the act or power of making one’s own choices or decisions:
accord, free will, choice, self-determination, volition, will
2 the state of being free from the control or power of another:
freedom, independence, independency, liberty,
self-determination, self-governance, self-government,
sovereignty
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Autonomy and Biological Systems
Living systems. . .
. . . are the first systems provided of (some level of) autonomy that we
have knowledge of
they work as autonomous systems
they evolved to become autonomous
The study of autonomy in biological systems
the hierarchy of living systems provide examples of many different
levels of autonomy—from lower to higher levels of autonomy
the evolutionary view over biological systems potentially sheds light
over the role of autonomy in living systems
→ the study of living system may help us understanding the many
different sorts of autonomy, and their role in (artificial) systems in
general
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Biology & Evolutionary Biology
Biology
. . . is the study of living organisms, or – perhaps more generally – of living
systems: their structure, function, growth, origin, evolution, and
distribution
Evolutionary biology
. . . studies how evolutionary processes produced diversity of life on Earth;
that is, how biological systems evolved over the ages [Gould, 2002]. As a
result, the view of evolutionary biology over biological systems includes
not just how they are made, and how they do work
but also – and mainly – how they do evolved towards their current
form—the one we can presently observe
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Biology vs. Evolutionary Biology
evolutionary biology is indeed a (nowadays constitutive) part of
biology
however, the way evolutionary biologists look over biological systems
tends to be less analytical – yet wider – than the one by biologists
including
an overall view of the life on Earth overcoming space and time
boundaries
the role and mutual influences of all organisms, species, and
ecosystems that inhabit (or, have inhabited) our planet
Roughly speaking, evolutionary biology provides us with a global view over
biological systems at every conceivable level
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Evolution & Diversity I
Not just genetic expression
genes (and their products) are at the core of ours evolutionary
model(s)
however, they alone cannot explain the full range of variation and
diversity of living systems
according to molecular biology, even distantly-related organisms use
similar processes for cellular function, development, and metabolism
[Rosslenbroich, 2014]
bacteria and humans share part of the same metabolism
microscopic fungi and humans exhibit a very similar basic cell
organisation and functions
and so on and so forth
→ most processes are conserved during evolution
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Evolution & Diversity II
Theory of facilitation variation [Kirschner and Gerhart, 2006]
while new features emerge without forerunners in more ancestral
organisms, “the core cellular processes” are conserved throughout
evolution
“a surprisingly small number of genes for humans and complex animal
forms reflects the anatomical and physiological complexity that can
be achieved by the reuse of genetic products” [Rosslenbroich, 2014]
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Evolution & Diversity III
A key question in evolutionary biology
So
how can we explain the huge diversity of life despite its deep and
pervasively similar molecular architecture? [Rosslenbroich, 2014]
how do organisms, species, and life overall progress along their
evolutionary path?
and, do they actually progress?
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Progress in Evolution I
A controversial issue
According to [Rosslenbroich, 2014], the acceptation of the word progress
conveys a number of diverse meanings—from Darwin to contemporary
biologists
1 change leads to new (higher) organisms
2 which are somehow improved
3 progression is linear
4 evolution is an intrinsic force driving such a process
5 progression has a goal / end / culmination / perfection
Nowadays, we just need the first acceptation: however, we need to
understand what is higher, what is change, and what is actually
progressing along with evolution
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Progress in Evolution II
Progress of what?
increased potential for survival?
increased efficiency of some form, like, energy consumption?
increased amount of information in genes?
increased differentiation?
increased complexity?
increased emancipation from the environment?
Nowadays, complexity is often used instead of progress: this, however, does
not offer any explanation—no clear large-scale patterns in evolution, here
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Autopoiesis I
Autopoiesis is the ability of a complex system of maintaining its own
overall coherence, in terms of structure and organisation, through the
mutual interactions of its components
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Autopoiesis II
Living systems as autopoietic systems
[Maturana and Varela, 1980, Varela et al., 1974]
living systems as autopoietic units capable of sustaining themselves
based on an inner network of reactions that generate and regenerate
all the system components
all pertinent processes required have an inner efficient cause
structures – based on a flow of molecules and energy – produce the
components that, in turn, continue to maintain the organised
bounded structure that gives rise to these components
self-reference and self-maintenance are core notions here
coherent and ordered global system behaviour of the system
constrains / governs the behaviour of the individual components,
while the component behaviour sustains the global order (circular
causality)
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Autopoiesis & Autonomy [Thompson, 2010] I
According to [Maturana and Varela, 1980], autonomous systems
acquire the property of specifying their own rules of behaviour
do not work as transducers or functions for converting input
instructions into output products
are the sources of their own activity, which specify their own domains
of interaction
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Autopoiesis & Autonomy [Thompson, 2010] II
“In fact, the notion of autopoiesis can be described as a charac-
terisation of the mechanisms which endow living systems with the
property of being autonomous; autopoiesis is an explication of the
autonomy of the living” [Maturana and Varela, 1980]
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Autonomy of a Cell [Thompson, 2010, Rosslenbroich, 2014]
An example of biological autonomy: the cell
the cell stands out of a molecular soup by actively creating the
boundaries that
set the cell apart from what it is not the cell
and simultaneously regulate cell interaction with the environment
metabolic processes within the cell construct those boundaries, but
the metabolic processes themselves are made possible by those
boundaries
thus, the cell emerges as a figure standing out of a chemical
background
should this process of self-production be interrupted, the cellular
components no longer form a unit, gradually diffusing back into a
molecular soup—death
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Autopoiesis & Autonomy [Thompson, 2010] I
Boundary
boundary is a central element of autonomy
it is a constitutive element of the identity of a system
in a cell, the membrane works as a boundary both containing
processes/components and regulating the interaction with the
environment
boundaries – strict physical ones, not necessarily material – are
essential for an autonomous system
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Autopoiesis & Autonomy [Thompson, 2010] II
Autonomous systems are closed [Rosslenbroich, 2014]
organisationally closed in the sense that their organisation is
characterised by their internal network processes
which recursively depend on each other, thus constitute the system as
a unit
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Heteronymous vs. Autonomous Systems
[Thompson, 2010, Rosslenbroich, 2014] I
Heteronymous systems
A heteronymous system is one whose organisation is defined by
input-output information flow and external mechanisms of control
traditional computational systems and many network views, for
example, are heteronymous
they have an input layer and an output layer
the inputs are initially assigned by the observer outside the system
output performance is evaluated in relation to an externally imposed
task
e.g., a Turing Machine typically represents computation by a
heteronomous system
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Heteronymous vs. Autonomous Systems
[Thompson, 2010, Rosslenbroich, 2014] II
Autonomous systems
An autonomous system is defined by its endogenous, self-organising, and
self-controlling dynamics, and determines the domain in which it operates
it has input and output—which, alone, do not determine the system
it is the internal self-production process that controls and regulates
the system’s interaction with the outside environment
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Autonomy and Environment I
Autonomy is not autarky
living systems are not independent of their environment
the interchange occurs though the physical boundary
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Autonomy and Environment II
Plants vs. animals
plants exhibit a predominantly open relation to their environment
instead, animals have a more closed form of organisation
the exchange surfaces for metabolism are turned to the inside
special internal organs and internal cavities appear
exchange surfaces on the outside are reduced
the loss of a direct environmental relation corresponds to a gain in
degrees of freedom
stimulus-response relationships in animals tend to be less tightly
connected
in animals, signals can internally be enforced, compared to other
signals, and memorised
thus, not a rigid, but rather a flexible relation between organism and
environment emerges when “moving up” from plants to animals
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Robustness
Stability in front of change
many structures and functions – as well as proteins and genes – have
certain stability in the face of environmental variations and genetic
changes
they are resistant, robust, to perturbations, producing relatively
invariant outputs [Kitano, 2002]
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Robustness in Living Systems
Robustness
is understood as a property that allows a system to maintain its
functions against internal and external perturbations and uncertainties
encompasses a broad range of traits: from macroscopic, visible traits,
to molecular traits, such as the expression level of a gene, or, the
three-dimensional conformation of a protein
is widely recognised as an inherent property of all biological systems
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Autonomy & Robustness
autonomy and robustness somehow overlap, but they are not the same
robustness may be seen as a pre-requisite for autonomy: for instance,
self-maintenance requires robustness
or, robustness is a part of autonomy, as it maintains the identity,
structure, and organisation of a living system against well-separated
surroundings
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Principles & Strategies for Robustness [Kitano, 2002]
redundancy of components to protect against failure of a specific
component by providing for alternative ways to carry out the
function the component performs
feedback circuits to monitor a system function so as to regulate it
modularity as the encapsulation of functions, for robustness and
evolvability
layering in hierarchical systems to enhance control and robustness
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Homeostasis
Homeostasis is the ability of a system to regulate its internal conditions to
keep some or several functions stable
e.g., properties such as temperature or blood composition in animals
separating internal and external environments
where internal environment is kept relatively stable with respect to
external perturbations
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Time Autonomy
living entities establish their own cycles in time
e.g., metabolism, rest-activity cycle, development, reproduction
involving all biochemical, cellular, and organic processes
from reaction rates, frequencies are endogenous, lead to autonomous
cycles, which only later synchronise with external cycles
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Evolutions through Increasing Autonomy
Increasing autonomy [Rosslenbroich, 2014]
which features are able to contribute to changes in autonomy of an
individual organism?
how can autonomy be defined accordingly in a more formal way?
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
38
homeostasis in body fl uids or of central nervous processing is elaborated, this is 
more a change in constitutive autonomy, although both also have relevance for 
interactive autonomy. 
 Several biological elements can contribute in different degrees to changes of 
autonomy (Fig.  3.3 ). They are not general rules or some sort of continuous trends. 
They rather function as a set of resources that can – singly or in combination with 
each other – increase autonomy.
 These elements are probably not complete. The various relations of the 
somewhat- heterogeneous elements to each other will also need further examination 
in the future. However, they can at least be identifi ed within the major evolutionary 
transitions, and changes in them can also be described. Thus, they are relevant. 
 One such element is  spatial separation from the environment , such as with cell 
membranes, cell walls, integuments of metazoans with cuticles, shells, hairs, or 
feathers. To different degrees, they all serve to keep the environment outside the 
organism and to regulate and direct the exchange with it. Changes in their organiza-
tion can contribute to an essential degree to changes in the organism-environment 
relation. 
 Homeostatic functions are means to establish and enhance internal functional 
stability. This overlaps to a large extent with changes in robustness. Another ele-
ment is the displacement of morphological structures or functions from an external 
position into an internal position within the organism, here summarized as  internal-
ization . Multiple processes of internalization are involved in building up the inner 
anatomy of organisms, ontogenetically as well as phylogenetically. During ontog-
eny, gastrulation and neurulation are typical internalizations. During phylogeny, for 
example, the transition from prokaryotes to eukaryotes included the internalization 
of some organisms within others (endosymbiosis). 
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 Fig. 3.3  Set of resources to change autonomy 
 
3 The Concept of Biological Autonomy
Resources to change autonomy—from [Rosslenbroich, 2014]
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
A Definition for Autonomy in Living Systems
General autonomy [Rosslenbroich, 2014]
Living systems are autonomous in the sense that they maintain themselves
in form and function within time and achieve a self-determined flexibility
1 they generate, maintain, and regulate an inner network of interdependent,
energy-consuming processes, which in turn generate and maintain the system
2 they establish a boundary and actively regulate their interaction and exchange with
the environment
3 they specify their own rules of behaviour and react to external stimuli in a
self-determined way, according to their internal disposition and condition
4 they establish an interdependence between the system and its parts within the
organism, which includes a differentiation in subsystems
5 they establish a time autonomy
6 they maintain a phenotypic stability (robustness) in the face of diverse
perturbations arising from environmental changes, internal variability, and genetic
variations
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Biology
Autonomy in Evolution
autonomy is an essential trait of living systems
many authors observe that evolution progresses through biological
systems with diverse degrees of autonomy
many additional functions resulting from evolutionary processes tends
to improve autonomy
how can autonomy help in understanding evolution?
is it a pattern of evolution?
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Increasing Autonomy [Rosslenbroich, 2014] I
increasing autonomy is defined as an evolutionary shift in the
system-environment relationship, such that
interactive autonomy the direct influences of the environment on the
respective individual systems are gradually reduced
constitutive autonomy stability and flexibility of self-referential,
intrinsic functions within the systems are generated and
enhanced
with respect to the environment
autonomy of living systems is relative
while retaining numerous interconnections with and dependencies on
the external environment
thus, organisms can undergo relative emancipation from environmental
fluctuations, gaining self-determination and flexibility of behaviour
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Increasing Autonomy [Rosslenbroich, 2014] II
a set of resources can be involved to change autonomous capacities
1 changes in spatial separation from the environment
2 changes in homeostatic capacities and robustness
3 internalisation of structures or functions
4 increase in body size
5 changes in the flexibility within the environment, including behavioural
flexibility
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Overall: Autonomy as a Driver for Evolution
autonomy is an essential trait of living systems
biological systems evolve towards increasing degrees of autonomy
autonomy is an evolutionary pattern
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Philosophy
Robots Playing Music: Which Autonomy?
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Philosophy
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy I
Many acceptations of autonomy
general an individual’s capacity for self-determination or
self-governance
folk inchoate desire for freedom in some area of one’s life
personal the capacity to decide for oneself and pursue a course of
action in one’s life
moral the capacity to deliberate and to give oneself the moral law,
rather than merely heeding the injunctions of others
political the property of having one’s decisions respected, honored,
and heeded within a political context
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Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy II
Individual autonomy
after Kant, autonomy is an essential trait of the individual, and
strictly related with its morality, represented by some high-level
ethical principles
then, with the relation between its inner self and its individual actions
that is, mind and behaviour
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Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy III
Independence from oneself
a more demanding notion of autonomy requires not only
self-determination, but also independence from oneself
this conception is connected with notions of freedom and choice, and
(maybe) non-determinism
and requires the ability of reasoning on (and possibly changing) not
just one own course of actions, but one own goals
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Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY 2011-2036 I
Automatic vs. autonomous
automatic systems are fully pre-programmed and act repeatedly and independently of
external influence or control. An automatic system can be described as
self-steering or self-regulating and is able to follow an externally given
path while compensating for small deviations caused by external
disturbances. However, the automatic system is not able to define the
path according to some given goal or to choose the goal dictating its
path.
autonomous systems are self-directed toward a goal in that they do not require outside
control, but rather are governed by laws and strategies that direct their
behavior. Initially, these control algorithms are created and tested by
teams of human operators and software developers. However, if machine
learning is utilized, autonomous systems can develop modified strategies
for themselves by which they select their behavior. An autonomous
system is self-directed by choosing the behavior it follows to reach a
human-directed goal.
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Military Systems
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY 2011-2036 II
Four levels of autonomy for unmanned systems [Edwards, 2013]
Various levels of autonomy in any system guide how much and how often
humans need to interact or intervene with the autonomous system:
human operated
human delegated
human supervised
fully autonomous
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Military Systems
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY 2011-2036 III
 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011-2036  
46 
… the ability to understand and control future costs from a program’s 
inception is critical to achieving affordability requirements. 
–Under Secretary of Defense Memorandum for Acquisition 
Professionals, Better Buying Power, September 2010 
 
 
While reduced reliance on human operators and analysts is the goal of autonomy, one of the 
major challenges is how to maintain and facilitate interactions with the operator and other human 
agents. An alternative statement of the goal of autonomy is to allow the human operator to “work 
the mission” rather than “work the system.” In other words, autonomy must be developed to 
support natural modes of interaction with the operator. These decision-making systems must be 
cognitively compatible with humans in order to share information states and to allow the 
operator and the autonomous system to interact efficiently and effectively. The level of 
autonomy should dynamically adjust based on workload and the perceived intent of the operator. 
Common terms used for this concept are sliding autonomy or flexible autonomy. The goal is not 
about designing a better interface, but rather about designing the entire autonomous system to 
support the role of the warfighter and ensure trust in the autonomy algorithms and the system 
itself. Table 3 contains the most commonly referenced description of the levels of autonomy that 
takes into account the interaction between human control and the machine motions. 
 
Table 3. Four Levels of Autonomy 
 
Level Name Description 
1 Human  
Operated 
A human operator makes all decisions. The system has no autonomous control of its environment 
although it may have information-only responses to sensed data. 
2 Human 
Delegated 
The vehicle can perform many functions independently of human control when delegated to do so. This 
level encompasses automatic controls, engine controls, and other low-level automation that must be 
activated or deactivated by human input and must act in mutual exclusion of human operation. 
3 Human 
Supervised 
The system can perform a wide variety of activities when given top-level permissions or direction by a 
human. Both the human and the system can initiate behaviors based on sensed data, but the system can 
do so only if within the scope of its currently directed tasks. 
4 Fully 
Autonomous 
The system receives goals from humans and translates them into tasks to be performed without human 
interaction. A human could still enter the loop in an emergency or change the goals, although in practice 
there may be significant time delays before human intervention occurs. 
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Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY 2011-2036 IV
Autonomy & unpredictability
the special feature of an autonomous system is its ability to be
goal-directed in unpredictable situations.
this ability is a significant improvement in capability compared to the
capabilities of automatic systems.
an autonomous system is able to make a decision based on a set of
rules and/or limitations.
it is able to determine what information is important in making a
decision.
it is capable of a higher level of performance compared to the
performance of a system operating in a predetermined manner.
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Autonomy in AWS I
Who takes the decision?
autonomy is at least about deliberation as much as about action
e.g., for artificial weapons, the question is not just
who pulls the trigger?
but also / rather
who decides to pull the trigger?
and
based on what evidence?
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Autonomy in AWS II
Autonomy & responsibility
responsibility is both an ethical and a legal issue
autonomy of AWS changes the overall picture
multi-level autonomy has the potential to make things even much
more complicated [Sartor and Omicini, 2016]
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Autonomy as a Relational Concept [Castelfranchi, 1995] I
Autonomy as a social concept
an agent is autonomous mostly in relation to other agents
autonomy has no meaning for an agent in isolation
Autonomy from environment
the Descartes’ problem: (human, agent) behaviour is affected by the
environment, but is not depending on the environment
situatedness, reactiveness, adaptiveness do not imply lack of
autonomy
Andrea Omicini (DISI, UniBO) Frontiers of Autonomous Systems Bologna, March 2018 88 / 276
On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Social Sciences & AI
Autonomous Goals [Castelfranchi, 1995] I
Agency
agents as teleonomic / teleologic, goal-driven entities
that is, whose behaviour is not casual under any acceptation of the
term
→ it might be non-deterministic, never casual
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Autonomous Goals [Castelfranchi, 1995] II
Agents & goals [Conte and Castelfranchi, 1995]
agents in a society can be generally conceived as either goal-governed
or goal-oriented entities
goal-governed entities refer to the strong notion of agency, i.e. agents
with some forms of cognitive capabilities, which make it possible to
explicitly represent their goals, driving the selection of agent actions
goal-oriented entities refer to the weak notion of agency, i.e. agents
whose behaviour is directly designed and programmed to achieve some
goal, which is not explicitly represented
in both cases, agent goals are internal
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Autonomous Goals [Castelfranchi, 1995] III
Executive vs. motivational autonomy
executive autonomy — given a goal, the agent is autonomous in achieving
it by itself
motivational autonomy the agent’s goals are somehow self-generated, not
externally imposed
Autonomy & autonomous goals
autonomy requires autonomous goals
executive autonomy is not enough for real autonomy
Goal-autonomous agent
A goal-autonomous agent is an agent endowed with its own goals
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Autonomous Goals [Castelfranchi, 1995] IV
An agent is fully socially autonomous if
1 it has its own goals: endogenous, not derived from other agents’ will
2 it is able to make decisions concerning multiple conflicting goals
(being them its own goals or also goals adopted from outside)
3 it adopts goals from outside, from other agents; it is liable to
influencing
4 it adopts other agents’ goals as a consequence of a choice among
them and other goals
5 it adopts other agents’ goals only if it sees the adoption as a way of
enabling itself to achieve some of its own goals (i.e., the autonomous
agent is a self-interested agent)
it is not possible to directly modify the agent’s goals from outside: any
modification of its goals must be achieved by modifying its beliefs
thus, the control over beliefs becomes a filter, an additional control
over the adoption of goals
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Autonomous Goals [Castelfranchi, 1995] V
6 it is impossible to change automatically the beliefs of an agent
the adoption of a belief is a special “decision” that the agent takes on
the basis of many criteria
this protects its cognitive autonomy
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Programming Languages
Evolution of Programming Languages: The Picture
[Odell, 2002]
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Programming Languages
Evolution of Programming Languages: Dimensions
Historical evolution
monolithic programming
modular programming
object-oriented programming
agent programming
Degree of modularity & encapsulation
unit behaviour
unit state
unit invocation
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Monolithic Programming
the basic unit of software is the whole program
programmer has full control
program’s state is responsibility of the programmer
program invocation determined by system’s operator
behaviour could not be invoked as a reusable unit under different
circumstances
modularity does not apply to unit behaviour
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Programming Languages
Modular Programming
the basic unit of software are structured loops / subroutines /
procedures / . . .
this is the era of procedures as the primary unit of decomposition
small units of code could actually be reused under a variety of
situations
modularity applies to subroutine’s code
program’s state is determined by externally supplied parameters
program invocation determined by CALL statements and the likes
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Object-Oriented Programming
the basic unit of software are objects & classes
structured units of code could actually be reused under a variety of
situations
objects have local control over variables manipulated by their own
methods
variable state is persistent through subsequent invocations
object’s state is encapsulated
object are passive—methods are invoked by external entities
modularity does not apply to unit invocation
object’s control is not encapsulated
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy in Programming Languages
Agent-Oriented Programming
the basic unit of software are agents
encapsulating everything, in principle
by simply following the pattern of the evolution
whatever an agent is
we do not need to define them now, just to understand their desired
features
agents could in principle be reused under a variety of situations
agents have control over their own state
agents are active
they cannot be invoked
agent’s control is encapsulated
agents are autonomous entities
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On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy for Software Agents
Autonomy as the Foundation of the Definition of Agent
Lex Parsimoniae: Autonomy
autonomy as the only fundamental and defining feature of agents
let us see whether other typical agent features follow / descend from
this somehow
Computational Autonomy
agents are autonomous as they encapsulate (the thread of) control
control does not pass through agent boundaries
only data (knowledge, information) crosses agent boundaries
agents have no interface, cannot be controlled, nor can they be
invoked
looking at agents, MAS can be conceived as an aggregation of
multiple distinct loci of control interacting with each other by
exchanging information
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(Autonomous) Agents (Pro-)Act
Action as the essence of agency
the etimology of the word agent is from the Latin agens
so, agent means “the one who acts”
any coherent notion of agency should naturally come equipped with a
model for agent actions
Autonomous agents are pro-active
agents are literally active
autonomous agents encapsulate control, and the rule to govern it
→ autonomous agents are pro-active by definition
where pro-activity means “making something happen”, rather than
waiting for something to happen
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Agents are Situated
The model of action depends on the context
any “ground” model of action is strictly coupled with the context
where the action takes place
an agent comes with its own model of action
any agent is then strictly coupled with the environment where it lives
and (inter)acts
agents are in this sense are intrinsically situated
Andrea Omicini (DISI, UniBO) Frontiers of Autonomous Systems Bologna, March 2018 104 / 276
On the Notion of Autonomy Autonomy for Software Agents
Agents are Reactive I
Situatedness and reactivity come hand in hand
any model of action is strictly coupled with the context where the
action takes place
any action model requires an adequate representation of the world
any effective representation of the world requires a suitable balance
between environment perception and representation
→ any effective action model requires a suitable balance between
environment perception and representation
however, any non-trivial action model requires some form of perception
of the environment—so as to check action pre-conditions, or to verify
the effects of actions on the environment
agents in this sense are supposedly reactive to change
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Agents are Reactive II
Reactivity as a (deliberate) reduction of proactivity
an autonomous agent could be built / choose to merely react to
external events
it may just wait for something to happen, either as a permanent
attitude, or as a temporary opportunistic choice
in this sense, autonomous agents may also be reactive
Reactivity to change
reactivity to (environment) change is a different notion
this mainly comes from early AI failures, and from robotics
it stems from agency, rather than from autonomy
however, this issue will be even clearer when facing the issue of
artifacts and environment design
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(Autonomous) Agents Change the World
Action, change & environment
whatever the model, any model for action brings along the notion of
change
an agent acts to change something around in the MAS
two admissible targets for change by agent action
agent an agent could act to change the state of another agent
since agents are autonomous, and only data flow among
them, the only way another agent can change their state
is by providing them with some information
change to other agents essentially involves
communication actions
environment an agent could act to change the state of the
environment
change to the environment requires pragmatical actions
which could be either physical or virtual depending on
the nature of the environment
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Autonomous Agents are Social
From autonomy to society
from a philosophical viewpoint, autonomy only makes sense when an
individual is immersed in a society
autonomy does not make sense for an individual in isolation
no individual alone could be properly said to be autonomous
this also straightforwardly explain why any program in any sequential
programming language is not an autonomous agent per se
[Graesser, 1996, Odell, 2002]
Autonomous agents live in a MAS
single-agent systems do not exist in principle
autonomous agents live and interact within agent societies & MAS
roughly speaking, MAS are the only “legitimate containers” of
autonomous agents
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Autonomous Agents are Interactive
Interactivity follows, too
since agents are subsystems of a MAS, they interact within the global
system
by essence of systems in general, rather than of MAS
since agents are autonomous, only data (knowledge, information)
crosses agent boundaries
information & knowledge is exchanged between agents
leading to more complex patterns than message passing between
objects
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Autonomous Agents Do not Need a Goal
Agents govern MAS computation
by encapsulating control, agents are the main forces governing and
pushing computation, and determining behaviour in a MAS
along with control, agent should then encapsulate the criterion for
regulating the thread(s) of control
Autonomy as self-regulation
the term “autonomy”, at its very roots, means self-government,
self-regulation, self-determination
“internal unit invocation” [Odell, 2002]
this does not imply in any way that agents needs to have a goal, or a
task, to be such—to be an agent, then
however, this does imply that autonomy captures the cases of
goal-oriented and task-oriented agents
where goals and tasks play the role of the criteria for governing control
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Agents as Autonomous Components
Definition (Agent)
Agents are autonomous computational entities
genus agents are computational entities
differentia agents are autonomous, in that they encapsulate control
along with a criterion to govern it
Agents are autonomous
from autonomy, many other features stem
autonomous agents are interactive, social, proactive, and situated;
they might have goals or tasks, or be reactive, intelligent, mobile
they live within MAS, and interact with other agents through
communication actions, and with the environment with pragmatical
actions
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Intelligent Agents I
According to a classical definition, an intelligent agent is a computational
system capable of autonomous action and perception in some environment
Reminder: computational autonomy
agents are autonomous as they encapsulate (the thread of) control
control does not pass through agent boundaries
only data (knowledge, information) crosses agent boundaries
agents have no interface, cannot be controlled, nor can they be
invoked
looking at agents, MAS can be conceived as an aggregation of
multiple distinct loci of control interacting with each other by
exchanging information
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Intelligent Agents II
Question: what about the other notions of autonomy?
autonomy with respect to other agents – social autonomy
autonomy with respect to environment – interactive autonomy
autonomy with respect to humans – artificial autonomy
autonomy with respect to oneself – moral autonomy
. . .
Question: what is intelligence to autonomy?
any sort of intelligence?
which intelligence for which autonomy?
which intelligent architecture for which autonomy?
. . .
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Intentional Systems
an idea is to refer to human attitudes as intentional notions
when explaining human activity, it is often useful to make statements
such as the following:
Seb got rain tires because he believed it was going to rain
Kimi is working hard because he wants to win world championship
again
these statements can be read in terms of folk psychology, by which
human behaviour can be explained and can be predicted through the
attribution of mental attitudes, such as believing and wanting (as in
the above examples), hoping, fearing, and so on.
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Intentional Agents Intentional Systems
The Intentional Stance
the philosopher – cognitive scientist – Daniel Dennett coined the term
intentional system to describe entities ‘whose behaviour can be
predicted by the method of attributing to it belief, desires and
rational acumen’ [Dennett, 1971]
Dennett identifies several grades of intentional systems:
1 a first-order intentional system has beliefs, desires, etc.
Seb believes P
2 a second-order intentional system has beliefs, desires, etc. about
beliefs, desires, etc. both its own and of others
Seb believes that Kimi believes P
3 a third-order intentional system is then something like
Seb believes that Kimi believes that Seb believes P
4 . . .
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The Intentional Stance in Computing
What entities can be described in terms of intentional stance?
human beings are prone to provide an intentional stance to almost
anything
sacrifices for ingratiating gods benevolence
animism
. . .
Ascribing mental qualities to machines [McCarthy, 1979]
Ascribing mental qualities like beliefs, intentions and wants
to a machine is sometimes correct if done conservatively and is
sometimes necessary to express what is known about its state [...]
it is useful when the ascription helps us understand the structure
of the machine, its past or future behaviour, or how to repair or
improve it
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Agents as Intentional Systems
Strong notion of agency
early agent theorists start from a (strong) notion of agents as
intentional systems
agents were explained in terms of mental attitudes, or mental states
in their social abilities, agents simplest consistent description implied
the intentional stance
agents contain an explicitly-represented – symbolic – model of the
world (written somewhere in the working memory)
agents make decision on what action to take in order to achieve their
goals via symbolic reasoning
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Which Domains for Intention Systems? I
Mental states are a worth abstraction for developing agents to effectively
act in a class of application domains characterised by various practical
limitations and requirements [Rao and Georgeff, 1995]
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Which Domains for Intention Systems? II
at any instant of time there are many different ways in which an
environment may evolve—the environment is not deterministic
at any instant of time there are many actions or procedures the agent
may execute—the agent is not deterministic, too
at any instant of time the agent may want to achieve several
objectives
the actions or procedures that (best) achieve the various objectives
are dependent on the state of the environment—i.e., on the particular
situation, context
the environment can only be sensed locally
the rate at which computations and actions can be carried out is
within reasonable bounds to the rate at which the environment
evolves
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Goal-Oriented & Goal-Directed Systems
there are two main families of architectures for agents with mental
states
teleo-reactive / goal-oriented agents are based on their own design
model and internal control mechanism. The goal is not
explicitly represented within the internal state, instead it
is an ‘end state’ for agents internal state machine
deliberative / goal-directed agents are based on symbolic reasoning
about goals, which are explicitly represented and
processed aside the control loop
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Modelling Agents with Mental States I
Modelling agents based on mental states. . .
eases the development of agents exhibiting complex behaviour
provides us with a familiar, non-technical way of understanding and
explaining agents
allows the developer to build MAS by adopting the perspective of a
cognitive entity engaged in complex tasks—e.g., what would I do in
the same situation?
simplifies the construction, maintenance, and verification of
agent-based applications
is useful when the agent has to comunicate and interact with users or
other system entities
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Modelling Agents with Mental States II
The intentional stance [Dennett, 2007]
The intentional stance is the strategy of interpreting the be-
haviour of an entity (person, animal, artifact, whatever) by treat-
ing it as if it were a rational agent who governed its ‘choice’ of
‘action’ by a ‘consideration’ of its ‘beliefs’ and ‘desires’.
The scare-quotes around all these terms draw attention to the
fact that some of their standard connotations may be set aside
in the interests of exploiting their central features: their role in
practical reasoning, and hence in the prediction of the behaviour
of practical reasoners.
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Modelling Agents with Mental States III
Agents with mental states
agents governing their behaviour based on internal states that mimic
cognitive (human) mental states
epistemic states representing agents knowledge—their knowledge on
the world
i.e., percepts, beliefs
motivational states representing agents objectives—what they aim to
achieve
i.e., goals, desires
the process of selecting one action to execute among the many
available based on the actual mental states is called practical
reasoning
i.e., action(next(i , perception(e))
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Practical vs. Epistemic Reasoning
practical reasoning is reasoning directed towards actions—the process of
figuring out what to do in order to achieve what is desired
[Bratman, 1987]
Practical reasoning is a matter of weighing conflicting considerations for
and against competing options, where the relevant considerations are
provided by what the agent desires/values/cares about and what the agent
believes.
epistemic reasoning is reasoning directed towards knowledge—the process
of updating information, replacing old information (no longer
consistent with the world state) with new information
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Practical Reasoning
practical reasoning consists of two main cognitive activities
deliberation when the agent makes decision on what state of affairs
the agent desire to achieve
means-ends reasoning when the agent makes decisions on how to
achieve these state of affairs
the outcome of the deliberation phase are the intentions
what agent desires to achieve, or what he desires to do
the outcome of the means-ends reasoning phase is the selection a
given course of actions
the workflow of the actions the agent intends to adopt in order to
achieve its own goals expressed as intentions
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Basic Architecture of a Mentalistic Agent
Perception
Action
Plans
Reasoning
Beliefs
Agent
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The Role of Intentions in Practical Reasoning I
1 intentions represent a problem to solve for the agent who need to
determine how to achieve them
if I have an intention to φ, you would expect me to devote resources to
deciding how to bring about φ.
2 intentions provide a filter for adopting other intentions, which must
not conflict
if I have an intention to φ, you would not expect me to adopt an
intention ψ such that φ and ψ are mutually exclusive
3 intentions tend to be stable: agents track the success of their
intentions, and are inclined to try again if their attempts fail
if an agent’s first attempt to achieve φ fails, then all other things being
equal, it will try an alternative plan to achieve φ
4 agents believe their intentions are possible
that is, they believe that there is at least some way that the intentions
could be brought about
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The Role of Intentions in Practical Reasoning II
5 agents do not believe they will not bring about their intentions.
it would not be rational for me to adopt an intention to φ if I believed
φ was not possible.
6 under certain circumstances, agents believe they will bring about their
intentions
it would not normally be rational of me to believe that I would bring
my intentions about; intentions can fail
moreover, it does not make sense that if I believe φ is inevitable that I
would adopt it as an intention
7 agents need not intend all the expected side effects of their intentions
if I believe φ→ ψ and I intend that φ, I do not necessarily intend ψ also
→ intentions are not closed under implication
this last problem is known as the side effect or package deal problem: I
may believe that going to the dentist involves pain, and I may also
intend to go to the dentist—but this does not imply in any way that I
intend to suffer pain
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Intentions vs. Desires
the adoption of an intention follows the rise of a given desire
i.e., it follows the adoption of a given goal
desires and intentions are different concepts
“My desire to play basketball this afternoon is merely a potential
influencer of my conduct this afternoon. It must live with my other
relevant desires [...] before it is settled what I will do”.
“In contrast, once I intend to play basketball this afternoon, the matter
is settled: I normally need not continue to weigh the pros and cons.
When the afternoon arrives, I will normally just proceed to execute my
intentions.” [Bratman, 1990]
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Means-Ends Reasoning I
the basic idea is to provide agents with three sorts of representations
representation of goal / intention to achieve
representation of actions / plans – in repertoire
representation of the environment
given the environmental conditions, means-ends reasoning aims at
devising out a plan that could possibly achieve the adopted goal /
intention
the selected intention is an emergent property, reified at runtime by
selecting a given plan for achieving a given goal
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Means-Ends Reasoning II
Means-Ends
  (planner)
Tasks
(Goals/Intentions)
State of Environment
(Beliefs)
Possible Actions
(Plan library)
Intention /
Plan to Achieve a 
Goal
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Implementing a Practical Reasoning Agent: Issues I
Problem
Agents have bounded resources—what is called bounded rationality
deliberation and means-ends processes are not for free: they have
computational costs
the time taken to reason and the time taken to act are potentially
unbounded
→ this harms agent fitness—that is, the reactivity and the promptness
that is essential for the agent to survive
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Implementing a Practical Reasoning Agent: Issues II
if the agent
starts deliberating at t0
begins means-ends at t1
begins executing a plan at t2
ends executing a plan at t3
then
time for deliberation is
tdeliberation = t1 − t0
time for means-ends reasoning is
tmeansend = t2 − t1
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Implementing a Practical Reasoning Agent: Issues III
agents environments are supposed to be highly dynamic
many concurrent changes may occur during agent decision-making as
well as during the execution of plans
the deliberated intention is surely worth to be pursued at the precise
time when it the deliberation process starts—so, at t0
at time t1, the agent selects a goal/intention that would have been
optimal if it had been achieved at t0
the agent runs the risk that the intention selected is no longer optimal
– or no longer achievable – by the time the agent has committed to it
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Implementing a Practical Reasoning Agent: Issues IV
So, this agent will exhibit an overall optimal behaviour in the following
circumstances / under the following conditions:
1 when deliberation and means-ends reasoning take a vanishingly-small
amount of time
2 when the world is guaranteed to remain (essentially) static while the
agent is deliberating and performing means-ends reasoning, so that
the assumptions upon which the choice of intention to achieve and
plan to achieve the intention remain valid until the agent has
completed both deliberation and means-ends reasoning
3 when an intention that is optimal when achieved at t0 – the time at
which the world is observed – is guaranteed to remain optimal until
t2—the time at which the agent has found a course of action to
achieve the intention
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The BDI Framework I
According to [Dasgupta and Ghose, 2011]
one of the most popular and successful framework for agent
technology is defined by Rao and Georgeff [Rao and Georgeff, 1992]
there, the notions of belief, desire, and intention are the core ones
hence, agents in this framework are typically referred to as BDI agents
Andrea Omicini (DISI, UniBO) Frontiers of Autonomous Systems Bologna, March 2018 141 / 276
Intentional Agents BDI Agents
The BDI Framework II
beliefs represent at any time the agent’s current knowledge about
the world, including
information about the current state of the environment
inferred from perception devices
messages from other agents
internal information
desires represent a state of the world the agent is trying to achieve
intentions are the chosen means to achieve the agent’s desires, and are
generally implemented as plans and post-conditions
as in general it may have multiple desires, an agent can
have a number of intentions active at any one time
these intentions may be thought of as running
concurrently, with one chosen intention active at any
one time
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The BDI Framework III
Besides these components, the BDI model includes
plan library — namely, a set of “recipes” representing the procedural
knowledge of the agent
event queue — where
events — either perceived from the environment or
generated by the agent itself to notify an update of its
belief base
internal subgoals — generated by the agent itself while
trying to achieve a desire
are stored.
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The BDI Framework IV
Plans & plan library
usually, BDI-style agents do no adopt first principles planning at all
all plans must be generated by the agent programmer at design time,
which are then selected for execution at run time
pre-programmed plans are collected in the plan library
the planning done by agents consists entirely of context-sensitive
subgoal expansion, which is deferred until a subgoal is selected for
execution
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The BDI Abstract Architecture
Accordingly, the abstract architecture proposed by [Rao and Georgeff, 1992]
comprise three dynamic and global structures representing agent beliefs,
desires, and intentions (BDI), along with an input queue of events
update (write) and query (read) operations are possible upon the
three structures
update operation are subject to compatibility requirements
formalised constraints hold upon the mental attitudes
the events that the system is able to recognise could be either
external – i.e., coming from the environment – or internal ones—i.e.,
coming from some reflexive action
events are assumed to be atomic, and can be recognised after they
have occurred
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Implementing a BDI Agent
1 the agent initialises the internal states
2 the agent enters the main loop
3 the option generator reads the event queue, and returns a list of
options
4 the deliberator selects a subset of options to be adopted, and adds
these to the intention structure
5 the intentions to be adopted are filtered from the selected ones
6 if there is an intention to perform an atomic action at this point in
time the agent executes it
7 any external events that have occurred during the interpreter cycle are
then added to the event queue (the same for internal events)
8 the agent modifies the intention and the desire structures by dropping
successful ones
9 finally, impossible desires and intentions are dropped, too
Andrea Omicini (DISI, UniBO) Frontiers of Autonomous Systems Bologna, March 2018 146 / 276
Intentional Agents BDI Agents
How does a BDI Agent Deliberate?
Problem
How can we made reasoning procedures of deliberation and option
generation sufficiently fast to satisfy the real time demands placed upon
the cognitive system?
deliberation can be decomposed in two phases:
option generation — understand what are the available alternatives
deliberation — choose (and filter) between the adoptable
goals/intentions
chosen options are then intentions, so the agents commit to the
selected ones—and executes them
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Refining Deliberation Function I
option generation — the agent generates a set of possible alternatives;
represents option generation via a function, options, which
takes agent’s current beliefs and current intentions, and from
them determines a set of options (i.e., desires)
deliberation — the agent chooses between competing alternatives, and
commits to the intention to achieving them; in order to select
between competing options, an agent uses a filter function
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Refining Deliberation Function II
Notes
the strategy for deliberating between goals typically is in the hands of
the agent developer
most BDI programming platforms provide mechanisms to describe
under which conditions some goal should inhibit the others (goal
formulae)
typically, such goal formulae are first-order logic predicates indicating
contexts and trigger conditions
game theory can enter the picture, here: i.e., maximising expected
utilities
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Structure of BDI Systems
BDI architectures are based on the following constructs
a set of beliefs
a set of desires (or goals)
a set of intentions
or better, a subset of the goals with an associated stack of plans for
achieving them; these are the intended actions
a set of internal events
elicited by a belief change (i.e., updates, addition, deletion) or by goal
events (i.e. a goal achievement, or a new goal adoption)
a set of external events
perceptive events coming form the interaction with external entities
(i.e. message arrival, signals, etc.)
a plan library (repertoire of actions) as a further (static) component
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Basic Architecture of a BDI Agent [Wooldridge, 2002]
BRF
Effectors
Action
Filter
Beliefs
Desires
Intentions
Agent
Generate
Options
Sensors
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Post-Declarative Systems
It was said that this approach leads to a kind of post-declarative
programming
in procedural programming, we say exactly what a system should do
in declarative programming, we state something that we want to
achieve, give the system general info about the relationships between
objects, and let a built-in control mechanism (e.g., goal-directed
theorem proving) figure out what to do
with intentional agents, we give a very abstract specification of the
system, and let the control mechanism figure out what to do, knowing
that it will act in accordance with the built-in theory of agency
Actually, the BDI framework combines in an excellent way both
(post)declarative structure and procedural knowledge in terms of plans
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Beliefs
Beliefs
Agents knowledge is structured in beliefs about the current state of the
world
they are informational units, typically implemented as ground sets of
literals, possibly with no disjunctions or implications
they should reflect only the information which is currently held (i.e.
situated)
they are expected to change in the future, i.e., as well as the
environment changes
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Plans
Plans
Plans represent the means the agent has to change the world, and to bring
it closer to his desires
they are language constructs, typically implemented in the form of
procedural structures
plans have a ‘body’, describing the workflow of activities (actions)
that have to be executed for plan execution to be successful
the conditions under which a plan can be chosen as an option are
specified in an invocation condition (triggering event) and a pre- or
context- condition (situation that must hold for the plan to be
executable)
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Intentions
Intentions
Intentions are emergent properties reified at runtime by selecting a given
plan for achieving a given goal
represented ‘on-line’ using a run-time stack of hierarchically plans
related to the ongoing adopted goals
similarly to how Prolog interpreter handle clauses
multiple intention stacks can coexist, either running in parallel,
suspended until some condition occurs, or ordered for execution in
some way
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BDI Viewpoints I
There are three main viewpoints over the BDI Model [Mazal et al., 2008]:
philosophical based on the work of philosopher Bratman [Bratman, 1987],
using uses terms of folk psychology to view humans as
planning agents: the main concepts in his work are beliefs
(what an agent knows about the world), desires (what the
agent wants, can be contradictory) and intentions (desires
that the agent has decided to reach, cannot be contradictory)
logical mainly Rao and Georgeff’s BDI CTL [Rao and Georgeff, 1998] –
multimodal logics with possible world semantics –, providing
beliefs, goals (desires), and intentions with a precise logical
semantics
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BDI Viewpoints II
implementation there are a huge number of systems and technologies that
are said to conform to the BDI model—between the BDI
CTL logics (very expressive) and the implementing systems.
which then treat the main modalities rather as data
structures, and mostly focus on plans
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BDI Agents Programming Platforms
Jason (Brasil) http://jason.sourceforge.net/
Agent platform and language for BDI agents based on AgentSpeak(L)
JADEX (Germany) http://www.activecomponents.org/
Agent platform for BDI and Goal-Directed Agents
2APL (Netherlands) http://www.cs.uu.nl/2apl/
Agent platform providing programming constructs to implement cognitive
agents based on the BDI architecture
3APL (Netherlands) http://www.cs.uu.nl/3apl/
A programming language for implementing cognitive agents
PRACTIONIST (Italy) http://practionist.eng.it/
Framework built on the Bratman’s theory of practical reasoning to support the
development of BDI agents
ASTRA http://astralanguage.com/
A distributed / concurrent programming language based on agent-oriented
programming
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Complex Systems
. . . by a complex system I mean one made up of a large number
of parts that interact in a non simple way [Simon, 1962]
Which “parts” for complex systems?
is autonomy of “parts” a necessary precondition?
is it also sufficient?
Which kind of systems are we looking for?
what is autonomy for a system as a whole?
where could we find significant examples?
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Nature-inspired Models
Complex natural systems
such as physical, chemical, biochemical, biological, social systems
natural system exhibit features
such as distribution, opennes, situation, fault tolerance, robustness,
adaptiveness, . . .
which we would like to understand, capture, then bring to
computational systems
Nature-Inspired Computing (NIC)
for instance, NIC [Liu and Tsui, 2006] summarises decades of research
activities
putting emphasis on
autonomy of components
self-organisation of systems
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Intuitive Idea of Self-Organisation
self-organisation generally refers to the internal process leading to an
increasing level of organisation
organisation stands for relations between parts in term of structure
and interactions
self means that the driving force must be internal, specifically,
distributed among components
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History of Self-Organisation
the idea of the spontaneous creation of organisation can be traced
back to Rene´ Descartes
according to the literature, the first occurrence of the term
self-organisation is due to a 1947 paper by W. Ross Ashby [Ashby, 1947]
Ashby defined a system to be self-organising if it changed its own
organisation, rather being changed from an external entity
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Elements of Self-Organisation
increasing order — due to the increasing organisation
autonomy — interaction with external world is allowed as long as the
control is not delegated
adaptive — suitably responds to external changes
dynamic — it is a process not a final state
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Self-Organisation in Sciences
initially ignored, the concept of self-organisation is present in almost
every science of complexity, including
physics
chemistry
biology and ecology
economics
artificial intelligence
computer science
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History of Emergence
emergence is generally referred as the phenomenon involving global
behaviours arising from local components interactions
although the origin of the term emergence can be traced back to
Greeks, the modern meaning is due to the English philosopher G.H.
Lewes (1875)
with respect to chemical reactions, Lewes distinguished between
resultants and emergents
resultants are characterised only by their components, i.e. they are
reducible
conversely, emergents cannot be described in terms of their components
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Definition of Emergence
we adopt the definition of emergence provided in [Goldstein, 1999]
Emergence [..] refers to the arising of novel and coherent
structures, patterns, and properties during the process of self-
organisation in complex systems. Emergent phenomena are con-
ceptualised as occurring on the macro level, in contrast to the
micro-level components and processes out of which they arise.
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Emergence vs. Holism
emergence is often, and imprecisely, explained resorting to holism
holism is a theory summarisable by the sentence the whole is more
than the sum of the parts
while it is true that an emergent pattern cannot be reduced to the
behaviour of the individual components, emergence is a more
comprehensive concept
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Properties of Emergent Phenomena
novelty — unpredictability from low-level components
coherence — a sense of identity maintained over time
macro-level — emergence happens at an higher-level w.r.t. to
components
dynamism — arise over time, not pre-given
ostensive — recognised by its manifestation
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Requirements for Emergency
Emergence can be exhibited by systems meeting the following
requirements
non-linearity — interactions should be non-linear and are typically
represented as feedback-loops
self-organisation — the ability to self-regulate and adapt the behaviour
beyond equilibrium — non interested in a final state but on system
dynamics
attractors — dynamically stable working state
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Definition of Self-Organisation
Widespread definition of self-organisation by [Camazine et al., 2001]
Self-organisation is a process in which pattern at the global level of a
system emerges solely from numerous interactions among the lower-level
components of the system. Moreover, the rules specifying interactions
among the system’s components are executed using only local information,
without reference to the global pattern.
it is evident that the authors conceive self-organisation as the source
of emergence
this tendency of combining emergence and self-organisation is quite
common in biological sciences
in the literature there is plenty of misleading definitions of
self-organisation and emergence [De Wolf and Holvoet, 2005]
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Natural Systems
natural systems can be broadly thought as [Di Marzo Serugendo et al., 2011]
physical systems
biological systems
social systems
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Physics and Chemistry
theory of self-organisation were originally developed within physics
and chemistry
most typical features included
when the system reaches a critical threshold, an immediate change
occurs
self-organisation can be observed globally
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Self-Organisation of Matter
self-organisation of matter happens in several fashion
in magnetisation, spins spontaneously align themselves in order to
repel each other, producing and overall strong field
Be´nard cells is a phenomena of convection where molecules arrange
themselves in regular patterns because of the temperature gradient
The left hand side picture displays Be´nard cells.
The right hand side picture displays magnetisation.
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Belousov-Zhabotinsky Reaction I
discovered by Belousov in the 1950s and later refined by
Zhabontinsky, BZ reactions are a typical example of
far-from-equilibrium system
mixing chemical reactants in proper quantities, the solution colour or
patterns tend to oscillate
these solutions are referred as chemical oscillators
there have been discovered several reactions behaving as oscillators
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Belousov-Zhabotinsky Reaction II
A snapshot of the Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction.
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Living Organisms
self-organisation is a common phenomenon in subsystems of living
organisms
an important field in biological research is the determination of
invariants in the evolution of living organisms
in particular the spontaneous appearance of order in living complex
systems due to self-organisation
in biological research, self-organisation essentially means the global
emergence of a particular behaviour or feature that cannot be reduced
to the properties of individual system’s components—such as
molecules and cells
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Prey-Predator Systems
the evolution of a prey-predator systems leads to interesting dynamics
these dynamics have been encoded in the Lotka-Volterra equation
[Sole´ and Bascompte, 2006]
depending on the parameters values the system may evolve either to
overpopulation, extinction or periodical evolution
the Lotka-Volterra equation:
dx
dt
= x(α− βy)
dy
dt
= −y(γ − δx)
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Lotka-Volterra Equation
A chart depicting the state space defined by the Lotka-Volterra equation.
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Synchronised Flashing in Fireflies I
some species of fireflies have been reported of being able to
synchronise their flashing [Camazine et al., 2001]
synchronous flashing is produced by male during mating
this synchronisation behaviour is reproducible using simple rules
start counting cyclically
when perceive a flash, flash and restart counting
Andrea Omicini (DISI, UniBO) Frontiers of Autonomous Systems Bologna, March 2018 183 / 276
Autonomy in Complex Artificial Systems Self-Organisation and Emergence in Natural Systems
Synchronised Flashing in Fireflies II
A photo of fireflies flashing synchronously.
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Schools of Fishes
School of fishes exhibit coordinated swimming: this behaviour can be
simulated based on speed, orientation, and distance perception
[Camazine et al., 2001].
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Flocks of Birds
The picture displays a flock of geese: this behaviour can be simulated
based on speed, orientation, and distance perception [Camazine et al., 2001].
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Insects Colonies
behaviours displayed by social insects have always puzzled
entomologist
behaviours such as nest building, sorting, routing were considered
requiring elaborated skills
for instance, termites and ants build very complex nests, whose
building criteria are far than trivial, such as inner temperature,
humidity, and oxygen concentration
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Termites Nest in South Africa
The picture displays the Macrotermes michealseni termite mound of
southern Africa.
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Trail Formation in Ant Colonies
The picture food foraging ants. When carrying food, ants lay pheromone,
adaptively establishing a path between food source and the nest. When
sensing pheromone, ants follow the trail to reach the food source.
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Simulating Food Foraging
The snapshots display a simulation of food foraging ants featuring a nest
and three food sources. Ants find the shortest path to each sources ad
consume first the closer sources. When no longer reinforced, the
pheromone eventually evaporates.
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Swarm Intelligence
swarm intelligence is a problem solving approach inspired by collective
behaviours displayed by social insects
[Bonabeau et al., 1999, Bonabeau and The´raulaz, 2000]
it is not a uniform theory, rather a collection of mechanisms found in
natural systems having applications to artificial systems
applications of swarm intelligence include a variety of problems such
as task allocation, routing, synchronisation, sorting
in swarm intelligence, the most successful initiative is Ant Colony
Optimisation
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ACO: Ant Colony Optimisation
ACO [Dorigo and Stu¨tzle, 2004] is a population-based metaheuristic that
can be used to find approximate solutions to difficult optimisation
problems
a set of software agents called artificial ants search for good solutions
to a given optimisation problem
to apply ACO, the optimisation problem is transformed into the
problem of finding the best path on a weighted graph
ACO provided solutions to problems such as VRP-Vehicle Routing
Problem, TSP-Travelling Salesman Problem and packet routing in
telecommunication networks
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Autonomic Computing
an industry driven research field initiated by IBM
[Kephart and Chess, 2003], mostly motivated by increasing costs in systems
maintenance
basic idea: applying self-organising mechanisms found in human
nervous system to develop more robust and adaptive systems
applications range from a variety of problems such as power saving,
security, load balancing
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SWARM-BOTS
SWARM-BOTS [Dorigo et al., 2005] was a project funded by European
Community tailored to the study of self-organisation and self-assembly of
modular robots
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AGV – Automated Guided Vehicles
stigmergy has been successfully applied to several deployments of
Automated Guided Vehicles [Weyns et al., 2005, Sauter et al., 2005]
basically, the AGVs are driven by digital pheromones fields in the
same way ants perform food-foraging
Pictures of AGVs
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Are SOS Autonomous?
they are adaptive, in that they properly respond to external stimuli
so their autonomy from the environment is partial
at the same time, they are self-governed, in that their evolution is
self-driven, in some essential sense—it is at least teleonomic
so, their autonomy is evident, as well
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Systems as Agents?
in the following, we take as understood the fact that the notion of
autonomy applies to systems
our implicit assumption is that users (generally) and designers (at
some point) consider a system as a whole, and conceive it as such
that is, as a computational system with its own computational
autonomy—which for us means an agent, at a certain level of
abstraction
→ this basically means that we can evaluate other notions of autonomy
for a system as a whole
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How Much Autonomy?
good design of a SOS provides the goals to be achieved, and the
means to self-organise the system structure accordingly
how much autonomy in that?
how much autonomy from the designer, from the user, from the
environment, overall?
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Which Autonomy for SOS?
self-organising systems (SOS) exhibit some autonomy by definition
their evolution over time is not pre-defined by the designer
→ in this sense, SOS are autonomous with respect to the designer
however, any evolution of a well-engineered SOS tends towards the
tasks / goals assigned by the designer
→ in this sense, SOS are not autonomous with respect to the designer
their evolution over time is not is influenced by the environment, but is
not directly driven by it
→ in this sense, SOS are autonomous with respect to the environment
most of the SOS we know are natural systems, where it is not clear
whether one can say that the goals are somehow self-generated
however, for sure, computational SOS built from those examples are
likely to show executive autonomy, without motivational autonomy
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Autonomy of SOS Depends on. . .
the models, mechanisms, and technologies adopted for implementing
computational SOS
! the level of autonomy of a SOS do not depend straightforwardly on
the level of autonomy of the agent components
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Component vs. System Autonomy
SOS are systems with some autonomy made of autonomous
components
however, no clear relationship between the sort of autonomy of
components and the sort of autonomy of the system can be stated a
priori
→ which basically means that autonomy of a SOS does not necessarily
rely upon its components only
→ and also means that issues like responsibly and liability require a
non-trivial, non-obvious treatment
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MAS 4 SOS
is the agent paradigm the right choice for modelling and developing
SOS?
are agents the right abstractions for SOS components?
are MAS the right way to put together components of a SOS?
in order to answer this question we have to compare requirements for
SOS with features of MAS
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SOS Requirements
from our previous discussion on self-organisation and emergence, a
possible basic requirements list can be given as follows:
autonomy and encapsulation of behaviour
local actions and perceptions
distributed environment supporting interactions
support for organisation and cooperation concepts
Andrea Omicini (DISI, UniBO) Frontiers of Autonomous Systems Bologna, March 2018 206 / 276
Autonomy in Complex Artificial Systems MAS vs. SOS
MAS Checklist
It is easy to recognise that the agent paradigm provides suitable
abstractions for each aspect
agents for autonomy and encapsulation of behaviour
situated agents for local actions and perceptions
MAS distribution of components, and MAS environment supporting
interactions through coordination
MAS support for organisation and cooperation concepts
Andrea Omicini (DISI, UniBO) Frontiers of Autonomous Systems Bologna, March 2018 207 / 276
Coordination for Self-Organisation & System Autonomy
Next in Line. . .
4 Autonomy in Complex Artificial Systems
5 Coordination for Self-Organisation & System Autonomy
Andrea Omicini (DISI, UniBO) Frontiers of Autonomous Systems Bologna, March 2018 208 / 276
Coordination for Self-Organisation & System Autonomy Coordination Models
Focus on. . .
4 Autonomy in Complex Artificial Systems
Self-Organisation
Self-Organisation and Emergence in Natural Systems
Self-Organisation and Emergence in Artificial Systems
Self-Organising Systems & Autonomy
Multi-Agent Systems vs. Self-Organising Systems
5 Coordination for Self-Organisation & System Autonomy
Coordination Models
Linda & Tuple-based Coordination
Nature-inspired Coordination
Tuple-based models for Nature-inspired Coordination
Coordination Technologies
Andrea Omicini (DISI, UniBO) Frontiers of Autonomous Systems Bologna, March 2018 209 / 276
Coordination for Self-Organisation & System Autonomy Coordination Models
Interaction & Coordination
Interaction
most of the complexity of complex computational systems – MAS
included – comes from interaction [Omicini et al., 2006]
along with an essential part of their expressive power [Wegner, 1997]
Coordination
since coordination is essentially the science of managing the space of
interaction [Wegner, 1997]
coordination models and languages [Ciancarini, 1996] provide abstractions
and technologies for the engineering of complex computational
systems [Ciancarini et al., 2000]
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Coordination Models for Complex Computational Systems
Coordination model as a glue
A coordination model is the glue that binds separate activities into
an ensemble [Gelernter and Carriero, 1992]
Coordination model as an agent interaction framework
A coordination model provides a framework in which the inter-
action of active and independent entities called agents can be
expressed [Ciancarini, 1996]
Issues for a coordination model
A coordination model should cover the issues of creation and de-
struction of agents, communication among agents, and spatial
distribution of agents, as well as synchronization and distribu-
tion of their actions over time [Ciancarini, 1996]
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What is Coordination?
Ruling the space of interaction
coordination 
elaboration /  
computation 
!"
!"
!"
!"
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A New Perspective over Computational Systems
Programming languages
interaction as an orthogonal dimension
languages for interaction / coordination
Software engineering
interaction as an independent design dimension
coordination patterns
Artificial intelligence
interaction as a new source for intelligence
social intelligence
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A Meta-model for Coordinated Systems I
The coordination meta-model [Ciancarini, 1996]
coordination entities — the entities whose mutual interaction is ruled by
the model, also called the coordinables (or, the agents)
coordination media — the abstractions enabling and ruling interaction
among coordinables
coordination laws — the rules governing the observable behaviour of
coordination media and coordinables, and their interaction as
well
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A Meta-model for Coordinated Systems II
interaction space
coordinable
coordination
medium
coordinable
coordinable
coordination
medium
coordination
medium
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A Meta-model for Coordinated Systems III
The coordination media. . .
“fill” the interaction space
enable / promote / govern the admissible / desirable / required
interactions among the interacting entities
according to some coordination laws
enacted by the behaviour of the media
defining the semantics of coordination
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The Ancestor
Linda [Gelernter, 1985]
Linda is the ancestor of all tuple-based coordination models
[Rossi et al., 2001]
in Linda, agents synchronise, cooperate, compete
based on tuples
available in the tuple spaces, working as the coordination media
by associatively accessing, consuming and producing tuples
the same holds for any tuple-based coordination model
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The Tuple-space Meta-model
The basics [Gelernter, 1985]
coordinables synchronise,
cooperate, compete
based on tuples
available in the tuple space
by associatively accessing,
consuming and producing
tuples
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Tuple-based / Space-based Coordination Systems
Linda meta-model [Ciancarini, 1996]
coordination media tuple spaces
as multiset / bag of data objects / structures called
tuples
communication language tuples / tuple templates
tuples as ordered collections of (possibly heterogeneous)
information items
templates as specifications of tuple sets
coordination language tuple space primitives
as a set of operations to put, browse and retrieve tuples
to/from the space
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Multiple Tuple Spaces
ts ? out(T)
Linda tuple space might be a bottleneck for coordination
many extensions have focussed on making a multiplicity of tuple
spaces available to processes
each of them encapsulating a portion of the coordination load
either hosted by a single machine, or distributed across the network
syntax required, and dependent on particular models and
implementations
a space for tuple space names, possibly including network location
operators to associate Linda operators to tuple spaces
for instance, ts @ node ? out(p) may denote the invocation of
operation out(p) over tuple space ts on node node
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Main Features of Tuple-based Coordination
Main features of the Linda model
tuples a tuple is an ordered collection of knowledge chunks, possibly
heterogeneous in sort
generative communication until explicitly withdrawn, the tuples generated
by coordinables have an independent existence in the tuple
space; a tuple is equally accessible to all the coordinables,
but is bound to none
associative access templates allow accessing tuples through their content
& structure, rather than by name, address, or location
suspensive semantics operations may be suspended based on unavailability
of matching tuples, and be woken up when such tuples
become available
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Nature-inspired Coordination for MAS
Coordination issues in natural systems
coordination issues did not first emerge in computational systems
[Grasse´, 1959] noted that in termite societies “The coordination of tasks
and the regulation of constructions are not directly dependent from
the workers, but from constructions themselves.”
Coordination as the key issue
many well-known examples of natural systems – and, more generally,
of complex systems – seemingly rely on simple yet powerful
coordination mechanisms for their key features—such as
self-organisation
it makes sense to focus on nature-inspired coordination models as the
core of complex nature-inspired MAS
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Stigmergy I
Stigmergy in insect societies
nature-inspired models of coordination are grounded in studies on the
behaviour of social insects, like ants or termites
[Grasse´, 1959] introduced the notion of stigmergy as the fundamental
coordination mechanism in termite societies
in ant colonies, pheromones act as environment markers for specific
social activities, and drive both the individual and the social
behaviour of ants
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Stigmergy II
Stigmergy in computational systems
nowadays, stigmergy generally refers to a set of nature-inspired
coordination mechanisms mediated by the environment
digital pheromones [Parunak et al., 2002] and other signs made and sensed
in a shared environment [Parunak, 2006] can be exploited for the
engineering of adaptive and self-organising MAS
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Chemical Coordination
Chemical reactions as (natural) coordination laws
inspiration comes from the idea that complex physical phenomena are
driven by the (relatively) simple chemical reactions
coordinating the behaviours of a huge amount of agents, as well as
the global system evolution
Chemical reactions as (computational) coordination laws
Gamma [Banaˆtre and Le Me´tayer, 1990] is a chemistry-inspired coordination
model—as for the CHAM (chemical abstract machine) model
[Berry, 1992]
coordination in Gamma is conceived as the evolution of a space
governed by chemical-like rules, globally working as a rewriting system
[Bana˘tre et al., 2001]
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Field-based Coordination
Computational fields as coordination laws
field-based coordination models like Co-Fields [Mamei and Zambonelli, 2006]
are inspired by the way masses and particles move and self-organise
according to gravitational/electromagnetic fields
there, computational force fields – generated either by the mobile
agents or by the pervasive coordination infrastructure – propagate
across the environment, and drive the actions and motion of the
agent themselves
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(Bio)chemical Coordination
Chemical reactions as coordination laws
chemical tuple spaces [Viroli et al., 2010] exploit the chemical metaphor
at its full extent—beyond Gamma
data, devices, and software agents are represented in terms of
chemical reactants, and system behaviour is expressed by means of
chemical-like laws
which are actually time-dependent and stochastic
embedded within the coordination medium
biochemical tuple spaces [Viroli and Casadei, 2009] add compartments,
diffusion, and stochastic behaviour of coordination primitives
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Basic Issues of Nature-inspired Coordination I
Environment
Environment is essential in nature-inspired coordination
it works as a mediator for agent interaction — through which agents
can communicate and coordinate indirectly
it is active — featuring autonomous dynamics, and affecting agent
coordination
it has a structure — requiring a notion of locality, and allowing
agents of any sort to move through a topology
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Basic Issues of Nature-inspired Coordination II
Stochastic behaviour
Complex systems typically require probabilistic models
don’t know / don’t care non-deterministic mechanisms are not
expressive enough to capture all the properties of complex systems
such as biochemical and social systems
probabilistic mechanisms are required to fully capture the dynamics of
coordination in nature-inspired systems
coordination models should feature (possibly simple yet) expressive
mechanisms to provide coordinated systems with stochastic
behaviours
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Linda is not a Nature-inspired Model
Warning
Linda is not a Nature-inspired Model
So, why Linda?
Why tuple-based models?
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Why Tuple-based Models? I
Expressiveness
Linda is a sort of core coordination model
making it easy to face and solve many typical problems of complex
distributed systems
complex coordination problems are solved with few, simple primitives
whatever the model used to measure expressiveness of coordination,
tuple-based languages are highly-expressive [Busi et al., 1998]
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Why Tuple-based Models? II
Environment-based coordination
generative communication [Gelernter, 1985] requires permanent
coordination abstractions
so, the coordination infrastructure provides agents with tuple spaces
as coordination services
coordination as a service (CaaS) [Viroli and Omicini, 2006]
they can be interpreted as coordination artefacts shaping
computational environment [Omicini et al., 2004]
and used with different levels of awareness by both intelligent and
“stupid” agents [Omicini, 2013]
as such, they can be exploited to support environment-based
coordination [Ricci et al., 2005]
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Why Tuple-based Models? III
Extensibility
whatever its expressiveness, Linda was conceived as a coordination
model for closed, parallel systems
so, in fact, some relevant problems of today open, concurrent systems
cannot be easily solved with Linda either in practice or in theory
as a result, tuple-based models have been extended with new simple
yet powerful mechanisms
generating a plethora of tuple-based coordination models
[Rossi et al., 2001]
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Why Tuple-based Models? IV
Nature-inspired extensions
Linda may not be nature-inspired, but many of its extensions are
many of the coordination models depicted before
stigmergy [Parunak, 2006]
field-based [Mamei and Zambonelli, 2004]
chemical [Viroli et al., 2010] and biochemical [Viroli and Casadei, 2009]
along with many others, such as
cognitive stigmergy [Ricci et al., 2007]
pervasive ecosystems [Viroli et al., 2012]
are actually nature-inspired tuple-based coordination models
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Examples I
StoKlaim
StoKlaim [De Nicola et al., 2006] – a stochastic extension of the
Linda-derived Klaim model for mobile coordination
[De Nicola et al., 1998] – adds distribution rates to coordination
primitives—thus making it possible the modelling of non-deterministic
real-life phenomena such as failure rates and inter-arrival times
SwarmLinda
SwarmLinda [Tolksdorf and Menezes, 2004] enhances Linda
implementation with swarm intelligence to achieve features such as
scalability, adaptiveness, and fault-tolerance—by modelling tuple
templates as ants, featuring probabilistic behaviour when looking for
matching tuples in a distributed setting
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Examples II
Situated ReSpecT [Mariani and Omicini, 2013]
ReSpecT [Omicini and Denti, 2001] generally addresses situated
dependency by capturing time, space, and environment events, and
supporting the definition and enforcement of situated coordination
policies
so, ReSpecT-programmed tuple centres can work as situated
abstractions for MAS-environment coordination
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Blending Metaphors
Mixing abstractions & mechanisms from different conceptual sources
most natural systems, when observed in their whole complexity,
exhibit layers each one featuring its own metaphors and mechanisms
correspondingly, many novel approaches to complex MAS
coordination integrate diverse sources of inspiration, e.g.:
TOTA [Mamei and Zambonelli, 2004] exploits mechanisms from both
stigmergic and field-based coordination
the SAPERE coordination model for pervasive service ecosystems
[Zambonelli et al., 2011, Viroli et al., 2012] integrates
the chemical metaphor for driving the evolution of coordination
abstractions
biochemical abstractions for topology and diffusion
the notion of ecosystem in order to model the overall system structure
and dynamics
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Expressing Full Dynamics
Expressing the full dynamics of complex natural systems
mostly, coordination models just capture some of the overall system
dynamics
which makes them basically fail
for instance, Gamma mimics chemical reactions, but does not capture
essential issues in chemical processes such as reaction rates and
concentration [Banaˆtre and Le Me´tayer, 1990, Bana˘tre et al., 2001]
instead, (bio)chemical tuple spaces fully exploit the chemical metaphor
by providing time-dependent and stochastic chemical laws
[Viroli et al., 2010, Viroli and Casadei, 2009]
more generally, the goal is to allow coordinated MAS to capture and
express the full dynamics of complex natural systems
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Core Mechanisms I
Understanding the basic elements of expressiveness
Linda is a glaring example of a minimal set of coordination
mechanisms providing a wide range of coordination behaviours
the goal is understanding the minimal set of coordination primitives
required to design complex stochastic behaviours
for instance, uniform coordination primitives – that is, Linda-like
coordination primitives returning tuples matching a template with a
uniform distribution [Gardelli et al., 2007] – seemingly capture the
full-fledged dynamics of real chemical systems within the coordination
abstractions
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Core Mechanisms II
Issues
autonomy and the limits of computational systems
expressiveness of languages and technologies
(technically, ethically, legally) admissible behaviours of computational
systems
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Predicting Complex Behaviours I
Engineering unpredictable systems around predictable abstractions
coordination models are meant to harness the complexity of complex
MAS [Ciancarini et al., 2000]
coordination abstractions are often at the core of complex MAS
while this does not make complex MAS generally predictable, it
makes it possible in principle to make them partially predictable,
based on the predictably of the core coordinative behaviour
suitably-formalised coordination abstractions, along with a
suitably-defined engineering methodology, could in principle ensure
the predictability of given MAS properties within
generally-unpredictable MAS
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Predicting Complex Behaviours II
Issues
autonomy and predictability
is unpredictability a pre-condition to choice, freedom, and so
autonomy?
how could unpredictability coexist with well-founded notions of
responsibility and liability?
partial predictability?
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Coordination for Simulation I
Simulation of complex systems is a multidisciplinary issue
. . . ranging from physics to biology, from economics to social sciences
no complex system of any sort can be studied nowadays without the
support of suitable simulation tools
nowadays, experiments done in silico are at least as relevant as those
in vitro and in vivo
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Coordination for Simulation II
Interaction issues are prominent in complex systems
coordination technologies potential core of agent-based simulation
frameworks
in particular, self-organising nature-inspired coordination models are
well suited for the simulation of complex systems
so, coordination middleware could play a central role in the
development of rich agent-based simulation frameworks for complex
systems
e.g., [Gonza´lez Pe´rez et al., 2013]
Issues
autonomy and simulation
what autonomy is required to simulate autonomous systems?
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Knowledge-oriented Coordination I
Integrating nature-inspired with knowledge-oriented coordination
intelligent MAS in knowledge intensive environments – as well as
complex socio-technical systems, in general – require automatic
understanding of data and information
knowledge-oriented coordination exploits coordination abstractions
enriched so as to allow for semantic interpretation by intelligent
agents [Fensel, 2004, Nardini et al., 2013]
for instance
chemical tuple spaces
SAPERE coordination abstractions and mechanisms
semantic tuple centres [Nardini et al., 2011]
all relay on the semantic interpretation of coordination items
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Knowledge-oriented Coordination II
Self-organisation of knowledge
explicit search of information is going to become ineffective while the
amount of available knowledge grows at incredible rates
knowledge should autonomously organise and flow from producers to
consumers
knowledge self-organisation for knowledge-intensive MAS
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Knowledge-oriented Coordination III
MoK (Molecules of Knowledge) [Mariani and Omicini, 2012a]
Molecules of Knowledge is a a nature-inspired coordination model
promoting knowledge self-organisation, where
sources of knowledge continuously produce and inject atoms of
knowledge in biochemical compartments
knowledge atoms may then aggregate in molecules and diffuse
knowledge producers, managers and consumers are modelled as
catalysts, whose workspaces are biochemical compartments, and their
knowledge-oriented actions become enzymes influencing atoms
aggregation and molecules diffusion
so as to make relevant knowledge spontaneously aggregate and
autonomously move towards potentially interested knowledge workers
the first application scenario for experimenting with MoK is news
management [Mariani and Omicini, 2012b]
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Knowledge-oriented Coordination IV
Issues
autonomy and knowledge
if (informed) choice is essential to freedom, and freedom is essential to
autonomous choice, then knowledge is essential to autonomy
autonomy of knowledge?
what is autonomy, when knowledge chunks autonomously move
towards knowledge consumers?
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Focus on. . .
4 Autonomy in Complex Artificial Systems
Self-Organisation
Self-Organisation and Emergence in Natural Systems
Self-Organisation and Emergence in Artificial Systems
Self-Organising Systems & Autonomy
Multi-Agent Systems vs. Self-Organising Systems
5 Coordination for Self-Organisation & System Autonomy
Coordination Models
Linda & Tuple-based Coordination
Nature-inspired Coordination
Tuple-based models for Nature-inspired Coordination
Coordination Technologies
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Coordination Middleware
JavaSpaces http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/articles/javase/
javaspaces-140665.html
A Java-based high-level tool for building distributed and
collaborative applications [Freeman et al., 1999]
Law-Governed Interaction (LGI) http://www.moses.rutgers.edu
A decentralised coordination and control mechanism for
distributed systems [Minsky and Ungureanu, 2000]
TuCSoN http://tucson.unibo.it
A model and technology for tuple-based coordination of
complex distributed systems [Omicini and Zambonelli, 1999]
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